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The Relation Between Firm-level Corporate Governance and
Market Value: A Case Study of India
By: N. Balasubramanian*, Bernard S. Black† & Vikramaditya Khanna††
I. Introduction
We know relatively little about the corporate governance practices of public firms in
emerging markets. This paper offers two principal contributions. First, we provide a detailed, “case
study” of firm-level governance practices in an emerging market, based on a 2006 survey of Indian
firms. India is a logical choice for this effort – it is the second largest emerging market based on
both population and GDP (after China), and the largest emerging market with a significant number
of non-government-controlled public firms. We are not aware of comparable efforts in other
countries, other than a contemporaneous effort by one of us in Brazil, with a smaller sample (Black,
de Carvalho and Gorga, 2008).
Second, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance indices and the connection
between governance and firm market value. We build a broad overall Indian Corporate Governance
Index (ICGI) and find a positive association between ICGI and firm market value. These results are
broadly consistent with those from multi-country studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and
Kim, 2005). However, the multi-country studies cover only the largest firms in each country. We
find that the association between ICGI and firm market value extends to, and may be stronger for,
smaller firms.
We also investigate the role of particular aspects of governance, such as board structure, in
predicting firms’ market values. Some other studies (Dahya, Dimitriev and McConnell, 2008 (crosscountry), Black and Kim, 2008 (Korea)) find a positive association between board structure and firm
market value. We do not; see also Black, de Carvalho and Gledson (2008) (negative association in
Brazil). Our results thus cast doubt on how much we yet know about what matters in governance.
The association between an overall index and firm market value, found in a number of individual
countries as well as in cross-country studies ([cites to come]), breaks down when one investigates
which aspects of governance underlie the overall relationship.
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Our findings, especially when combined with those from other countries, suggest that the
benefits of particular corporate governance practices vary depending on firm and country
characteristics. This suggests that governance is not one-size fits all (see also Arcot and Bruno,
2006; Bruno and Claessens, 2007; Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2010). A combination of some
mandatory minimum rules (perhaps differing based on firm size) and flexibility above the minimum
level – for example, by allowing firms to self select levels of governance (as in Brazil) or comply-orexplain regimes (as in the UK and Continental Europe) -- may prove more valuable than legal
regimes that rely primarily on mandatory rules.
Part II summarizes the relevant literature and India's corporate governance history. Part III
discusses our survey methodology and data sources. Part IV discusses survey results. Part V defines
a corporate governance index and examines the relationship between index scores and firm market
value. Part VI discusses some implications of our study for what matters in corporate governance in
emerging markets. Part VII concludes.
II. Literature Review
We review here the literature on two aspects of governance in emerging markets: what we
know about governance patterns, and to what extent does governance predict firm share prices or
performance. We cover studies of India with care, and other studies in less depth. We do not cover
developed countries or nonpublic firms.
A. What We Know About Firm-Level Governance in Emerging Markets
This paper's first goal is to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of firm-level governance in
an important emerging market. We know remarkably little about the details of firm-level
governance. Cross-country studies of governance provide high level comparisons between countries
-- for example, mean scores on disclosure (Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002) or overall governance
(Bruno and Claessens, 2010) -- but few details. Individual country studies report summary statistics
for overall governance and particular governance measures, but again few details. To our
knowledge, the most directly comparable paper is contemporaneous research on Brazil (Black, de
Carvalho, and Gorga, 2010a; 2010b).
Several studies examine Indian corporate governance generally. Khanna (2009) reviews the
development of corporate governance norms in India from independence to the present. World
Bank (2005), Sarkar & Sarkar (2000), and Mohanty (2003) examine how firm-level governance
influences the behavior of institutional investors, or vice-versa.
Mohanty (2003) finds that
institutional investors own a higher percentage of the shares of better-governed Indian firms. This
is consistent with research in other countries (Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005; Ferreira and
Matos, 2007).
Zattoni, Pedersen and Kumar (2009) and Singh and Gaur (2009) examine the association
between business group membership and performance with conflicting results. Jackling & Johl
study the association between board structure and firm performance in large Indian firms and find
an association between board size and Tobin’s q, but report only three stage least squares results,
with unconvincing instruments. Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) examine whether adoption of Clause
49 (an important set of governance reforms in India) predicts lower volatility and returns for large
Indian firms. Black & Khanna (2007) conduct an event study of the adoption of Clause 49 and
report positive returns to a treatment group of large firms (who were required to comply quickly)
relative to small firms (for whom compliance was delayed), around the first important legislative
2
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announcement. Dharmapala and Khanna (2009) report that small Indian firms which are subject to
Clause 49 react positively to plans by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) -- India's
securities regulator -- to enforce the Clause, relative to similar firms not subject to Clause 49.
Other studies of Indian firms are more peripherally related. Khanna, Kogan and Palepu
(2006), study instances of minority shareholder expropriation by Indian firms. Bertrand, Mehta and
Mullainathan (2002) provide evidence on tunneling within Indian business groups. Deb and
Chaturvedula (2004) study the relationship between ownership concentration and firm market value.
B. Does Governance Predict Firm Value in Emerging Markets?
A second goal of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the connection between
firm-level governance and firm market values in emerging markets. A number of cross-country
studies examine this connection (e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Klapper and
Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2007;; see also the survey by Love
(2010). However, these studies have important weaknesses, including: they rely on one of two
available indices, each imperfect;1 they cover only the largest firms in each country; and they have
limited control variables (which increases the risk of omitted variable bias).
Individual country studies, such as this one, have different strengths and weaknesses, and
can complement the cross-country studies. These studies are of uncertain generalizability.
However, they allow one to: (i) study the association between governance and performance at both
large and small firms; (ii) develop, as we do here, a country-specific governance index which reflects
a particular country’s rules and norms; (iii) use current indices . In contrast, the S&P and CLSA
indices are already becoming dated, and have other important limitations (the S&P index is limited
to disclosure; CLSA relies in part on analysts' subjective opinions). The principal studies which
develop and assess overall governance measures for emerging markets include:





Brazil (Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2007; Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, 2010b)
Hong Kong (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou, 2007)
Korea (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006a)
Russia (Black, 2001; Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006).
III. Survey Methodology and Data Sources

A. Survey Methodology
This study relies on an extensive survey we conducted in early 2006 of 506 Indian public
companies ("India CG Survey 2006"). We received 370 responses (73% response rate).2 We
surveyed firms with central offices in one of India's six largest cities -- Bangalore, Chennai,
Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and New Delhi. We approached all firms in the BSE 200 index with
1 These are: Standard & Poor's transparency and disclosure index (2002; only disclosure); and Credit Lyonnais
Securities Asia survey (2001; some questions are subjective; responses could be influenced by firm performance).
2 A copy of the survey is available on request from the authors. Most respondents held senior positions at
their firms (309 were chief legal officer or company secretary; 42 were CFO or other senior finance official; 10 were the
CEO). The survey was supported by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and IIM Bangalore, one of India's top
business schools. We mailed a survey to each firm, did followup mailings and phone calls, and engaged the A.C. Nielsen
survey research firm to visit firms. The higher response rates for BSE 201-500 firms and non-BSE-500 firms (see Table
1) could reflect a tendency for A.C. Nielsen to contact firms with whom they had prior relationships. We promised
confidentiality to respondents, and thus do not name individual firms in this paper.
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central offices in these cities; these firms include 26 of the firms in the BSE 30 index and 131 of the
BSE 200 firms.3 For smaller firms, we asked A.C. Nielsen to select firms at random, with a tilt
toward firms in the BSE 500 index. Overall, we approached 275 firms in the BSE 500 (55%); these
firms represent 80% (76%) of the market capitalization of the BSE 500 (all Indian public firms). For
details on the survey questions, see Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2009).
The size and other financial characteristics of approached firms are similar to
nonapproached firms and those of responding firms are similar to nonresponding firms. Thus,
sample selection bias is likely to be limited, relative to all Indian private firms large enough to be
included in the Prowess financial database (the principal source of financial information for Indian
firms, similar to a combined Compustat and CRSP for U.S. firms). We did not study very small
firms which are publicly listed, but rarely trade and are not covered by Prowess.4
Table 1 provides summary information on the firms we approached and those which
responded. The response rates exceeded 50% for all BSE group ranges.
Table 1. Surveyed and Responding Firms
Number of firms approached and number of respondents in different size ranges, for India CG Survey 2006. Total row
includes all firms in Prowess database (database of Indian public firms.
Size Group
BSE 30
BSE 31-100
BSE 101-200
BSE 201-500

Subtotal BSE 500
Other
Total

No in
group
30
70
100
300

Approached(% of
total)
26 (87%)
45 (64%)
61 (61%)
143 (47%)

Responses (% of
surveyed)
20 (77%)
26 (58%)
31 (51%)
82 (56%)

500

275 (55%)

160 (58%)

2,007
2,507

231 (15%)
506 (20%)

210 (91%)
370 (73%)

Of the 370 respondents, 31 were government-controlled, 38 were foreign-controlled.5 Our
analysis below focuses on the remaining 301 firms, which we term "Indian private firms." The
response rate for these firms was 77% (301/393). Of these 301 firms, 55% are part of an Indian
business group which includes one or more other public firms; 69% have a 40% or greater
shareholder.

The standard stock price indices for Indian firms are BSE 30 (also called Sensex); BSE 100, BSE 200, BSE
500 and, for the National Stock Exchange, the Nifty Fifty. Most large Indian firms are listed on both exchanges.
4 Respondents might self-report with bias, but it seems likely that this bias is not severe. First, a significant
number of firms do not comply with Indian rules on board independence, which is verifiable from both their annual
reports and their survey responses. This suggests that firms do not expect significant consequences from
noncompliance. Given this, plus our promise of confidentiality, firms had little reason to misreport to us. Second, for
some governance elements, we have data both from annual reports (which are public, hence misreporting may be riskier)
and from our survey; there are occasional differences between the two sources, but no systematic differences.
5 We classified as foreign-controlled firms with a majority foreign owner or a 40% foreign owner who held
more than any other shareholder. We classified as government-controlled 25 firms which are majority owned by the
central government or a state government, 5 firms with at least 39% government ownership, and Cement Corp. of India,
which has missing ownership data. Prowess classifies all of these firms as government firms. No firms have between
11% and 39% government ownership.
3
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IV. Indian Corporate Governance Overview
This Part provides a detailed overview of the corporate governance of Indian private firms.
Results are based only on responding firms except as noted. Balasubramaniam, Black and Khanna
(2009) provide additional details and citations to the applicable legal rules.
A. Board Composition and Independence
The principal sources of Indian corporate governance rules are the Company Law and
“Clause 49” of the stock exchange listing requirements, issued by the Indian securities regulator,
SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India). Clause 49 requires listed firms with net worth
greater than Rs. 25 crores (1 crore = 107 rupees ≈ US$200,000) or paid up share capital greater than
Rs. 3 crores at any time in their history to have either a majority of independent directors, or at least
1/3 independent directors plus a board chairman who is not the CEO (but need not be
independent, and often represents the controlling family or business group). Table 2 provides
information on board composition. Larger firms have larger boards (Pearson correlation between
ln(market capitalization), and board size = 0.20, p < .01).
Some Indian firms have complained that it can be hard for them to find qualified
independent directors. Table 2 suggests that most surveyed firms can find independent directors;
how qualified, we do not know.
Table 2. Percentages of Different Types of Directors
Sample is 295 firms with board composition data which responded to India CG Survey 2006.
Percentage range

Inside

0%
7
1-32%
121
33-49%
98
50%
35
51-74%
31
75-100%
3
Total
295
mean (median) % 35% (33%)
mean (median)
2.82 (3)
number of directors

Nonexecutive
Independent
(not indep.)
152
97
31
4
9
2
295
12.7% (0%)

7
13
68
70
108
29
295
53% (50%)

1.09 (0)

4.35 (4)

Separate CEO and chairman
(for firms in range for
independent directors)
2
9
50
34
67
13
175 (59%)

The final column of Table 2 shows the number of firms, within a particular range for
percentage of independent directors, who have separate CEO and chairman. This practice is
common; it is followed by 175 (59%) of responding firms. However, 20 firms (7%) do not comply
with the requirement of at least 33% independent directors. In addition, of the 68 firms with 3349% independent directors, 18 do not have a separate CEO and chairman; and thus also do not
comply with Clause 49. In all, 257 firms (87%) comply with the board independence rules.
If the independence rules are appropriate (a topic we do not explore here), this level of
noncompliance could be worrisome. Yet, in assessing the reliability of survey responses, reports of
non-compliance may be good news. That some firms reported not complying with Clause 49 gives
us more confidence that firms who report complying in fact comply.

5
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We also asked about director backgrounds. Clause 49 requires firms to have an audit
committee, and requires the audit committee to have at least one person with financial or accounting
expertise; 96% of firms comply. Over 20% of firms have a director who explicitly represents
minority shareholders or institutional investors. There is a fair bit of gender diversity, with 30% of
firms having a female director (but typically only one).
Some aspects of firms' choices for directors provide some basis for concern. One may
doubt the business expertise of a typical scholar. Yet 39% of firms turn to scholars to fill the ranks
of independent directors, and often add several such persons to their boards; the mean number of
scholar-directors for firms which take this route is 2.6. A similar percentage of firms have a lawyer
on the board, but typically only one. Perhaps reflecting the importance of government regulation
and political connections, 30% of firms have a former government official or former politician on
their board.6
B. Board Practices and Processes
We turn next to the survey questions that assess board practices and processes. These are
summarized in Table 3, along with an indication of which practices are legally required practices, and
when the requirement was adopted.
Indian law allows director terms to be up to 5 years but also requires either (i) annual terms
or (ii) at least two-thirds of the directors should serve staggered terms, with a 3-year maximum.
Most firms use multiyear terms for both executive and nonexecutive directors, usually 3 or 5 years
for executives and 3 years for nonexecutives.
Indian law requires at least 4 board meetings per year, with no more than 3 months between
meetings. All but eight firms met this rule; the median number of physical meetings per year is 6.
However, three outlier firms reported that their board never met during the year! Only 11% of
firms reported sometimes using phone or other electronic meetings, instead of physical meetings.
Indian law requires firms to prepare minutes for board and board committee meetings. Almost all
firms prepare minutes for meetings of board committees. Only 75% said that dissents would be
recorded in the minutes. However, some "no" answers could reflect lack of dissents, rather than a
practice of not recording them.

6 By comparison, Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) report, for Korean directors over 1999-2002 (period of rapid
change in Korean boards, partly due to legal mandates), the average firm had 32% outside directors; 25% of firms had
one or more academics as directors; 16% had one or more lawyers, and 13% had one or more former politicians or
government officials.

6
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Table 3. Board Practices and Processes
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. Number of missing or ambiguous
responses ranges from 0 to 18. Percentages are of firms with usable responses.

Required

Characteristic
Director terms
nonexecutive directors have staggered terms
executive directors have multiyear terms
Board meetings
Minimum of 4 physical meetings
No. of physical meetings
minutes prepared
Dissents recorded in minutes
Evaluation of CEO and other executives
regular system for evaluating CEO
regular system for evaluating other executives
succession plan for CEO
annual separate meeting for nonexecutive directors
board replaced CEO in last 5 years
Evaluation of nonexecutive directors
regular system for evaluating nonexecutive directors
retirement age for nonexecutive directors
Director not renominated or resigned due to
performance or policy dispute during last 5 years
Other
code of conduct
policy restricting insider trading
board members typically receive materials at least
one day in advance of meeting

Firms with
characteristic

mean
(median)

(1956)
275 (91%)
261 (92%)
(2001)

293 (98%)

(1956)
(1956)

297 (99%)
211 (75%)

6.9 (6)

151 (51%)
248 (83%)
86 (29%)
46 (15%)
0
(2001)
(recommended)

76 (25%)
44 (15%)
7

(2004)

275 (91%)
278 (92%)
291 (96%)

(2001)
(recommended)

regular director training

30 (13%)

About half of Indian private firms report that they regularly evaluate the CEO; a larger
number (83%) evaluate other executives. One wonders, however, how rigorous these evaluations
are, given that zero firms reported that the board had replaced the CEO in the last 5 years, and only
three reported replacing other executives! Perhaps some CEOs were quietly encouraged to pursue
other opportunities and the respondent did not know the circumstances under which a CEO left.
Still, Indian CEOs do not appear to be at grave risk of losing their jobs for poor performance. We
also asked about the existence of a CEO succession plan; only about 30% of respondents had one.
Only 15% held an annual board meeting solely for nonexecutive directors.
Clause 49 includes some recommended items. One is that firms evaluate the performance of
nonexecutive directors. About one-quarter of responding firms report doing so. Only about 15%
of respondents had a retirement age for directors. There were occasional instances – a total of 7 –
in which a director was not renominated or resigned due to performance concerns or a policy
dispute. Here too, reporting could be incomplete, or the respondent may not have known the
reasons for board turnover.
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Clause 49 requires firms to adopt a code of conduct. About 90% of respondents have such
a code; a similar number have a policy restricting insider trading. A full 96% normally provide
materials to directors at least one day before board meetings. However, only 13% comply with the
Clause 49 recommendation to provide regular director training.
C. Audit Committee
Clause 49 requires firms to have audit committees with at least three members, all
nonexecutives, an independent chair, and at least one member with expertise in finance or
accounting. The committee must meet at least four times per year. All but three responding firms
have an audit committee. Of the firms with a committee, all but three (one) have the required
number of members (a member with accounting or finance expertise).
Practice is less uniform on how audit committees operate. Only 65% of respondents
reported that the audit committee recommends reappointing or dismissing the external auditor, even
though Clause 49 requires that the audit committee have this power. Seventy-nine percent have the
required 4 meetings per year, but another 18% report having three meetings; only 11 firms report 02 meetings. Only 68% of respondents have a bylaw to govern the audit committee, and at only 72%
do the independent members meet separately at least once per year. One lone firm gives minority
shareholders the power to appoint an audit committee member.
D. Compensation of Executives and Nonexecutives
Table 4 provides information on executive compensation and compensation disclosures.
For most survey questions, complete responses were the norm, but not for compensation, either
because respondents lacked the information or chose not to provide it. Executive compensation is
modest by U.S. standards. The mean (median) CEO receives annual cash compensation of 64 (30)
lakhs (1 lakh = 105 rupees ≈ US$2,000). Only 16% of Indian private firms use stock options, which
are the usual road to riches for U.S. executives. Most option grants are also modest.7
Indian law requires firms to obtain government approval to pay compensation above –
generally speaking -- the greater of (i) 5% of net profits for one manager and 10% for all managers;
or (ii) if the firm doesn't meet the percentage of profits test, between Rs. 9 lakhs for small firms (< 1
crore in book value of equity) and 24 lakhs for large firms (> 100 crores in book value of equity).
Executive compensation under clause (ii) must also be approved by shareholders. Government
approval to exceed these levels is usually obtainable, but the combination of these levels, desire to
avoid seeking approval, and the need to obtain approval if over the threshold could all constrain
executive pay. Seventeen percent of firms (52/301) obtained government approval.
Indian law requires companies to disclose the total pay of the CEO and each director. We
asked firms about their disclosure, but cannot distinguish between "no" and missing responses.
Most firms disclose CEO pay (95%), but compliance is lower for the pay of other directors. Indian
law requires shareholders to approve the pay of all directors as a group, but does not require
separate approval of CEO pay. Oddly, 89% of firms report that shareholders approve CEO pay,
while only 70% report that shareholders approve the pay of all directors, even though the latter is
the legal requirement.
A back-of-the-envelope estimate: The median grant to a CEO of 100,000 options might have an implied
value 100,000 x (typical $2 share price) x (0.40 estimate of option value/share price) = $80,000.
7
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Table 4. Executive and Director Compensation
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. Compensation is in lakhs (1 lakh = 105
rupees ≈ $2,000); options are in thousands of shares. For compensation, number of usable responses is shown. For
disclosure and approval, we cannot distinguish between “no” and missing responses.

Compensation
CEO cash compensation
Compensation of all other executives
Executives receive stock options
Disclosure and Shareholder Approval
CEO total pay
total pay of nonexecutive directors
total pay of all directors

Required

Responses mean (median)
251
64 (30)
184
2273 (154)
49/299 (16%)
Disclosed
Approved
(1956)
286 (95%)
267 (89%)
(1956) & (2004) 231 (77%)
183 (61%)
(1956) & (2001) 267 (89%)
211 (70%)

E. External Auditor
We also asked about auditor independence. The external auditor provides non-audit services
at about half of the firms. When the auditor provides non-audit services, mean (median) fees for
non-audit services are 18% (10%) of the auditor's total fees.
Indian law does not require rotation of audit firms, or the engagement partner within an
audit firm. Nonetheless, almost half of firms report that their audit firm rotates the partner
responsible for their account every 5 years. Auditor dismissal is rare -- only 2 firms noted dismissals
in the last 5 years. One firm said the reason was fees charged, the other did not provide a reason.
F. Shareholder Rights
Table 5 summarizes questions related to shareholder rights. Indian law has required
companies to allow postal ballots since 1956, yet only 73% do so. Given that most firms have a
controlling shareholder, the fraction of shares voted at the most recent annual shareholder is
surprisingly small, at a mean of only 58%. This suggests that minority shareholders often do not
vote. Yet shareholder resolutions are not uncommon. About one-sixth of firms had one or more
resolutions proposed in the last 5 years.
Indian law provides takeout rights on a sale of control, which require the new controller to
offer to buy all shares at the price paid for the controlling shares. We asked whether minority
shareholders receive takeout rights, but only 21 firms (8%) reported providing these rights. Possible
explanations include poor phrasing (we asked whether the firm, rather than the new controller,
provides the rights), or ignorance of this requirement. The famously slow Indian judicial system
limits the effectiveness of shareholder remedies. A modest number of firms (20 firms, 7%) have
responded to problems with the courts by providing for disputes with shareholders to be resolved
by arbitration.
Under Indian law, shareholders holding 10% of a company's shares can demand that the
company hold a special shareholder meeting. This happened at 14 firms (5%) during the last five
years. Shareholders can also asked SEBI or a special appellate court, the Companies Appellate
Tribunal, to investigate oppression by the controlling shareholder, but only one firm reported facing
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such an investigation in the last five years. Finally, only one firm has issued preferred shares. Thus,
Indian firms are not using these shares to avoid the one common share, one vote regime.8
Table 5. Shareholder Rights
Table shows promoter ownership for non-bank Indian private firms (% of responding firms). Sample is 301 firms
which responded to India CG Survey 2006 and have ownership data on Prowess. Number of missing or ambiguous
responses ranges from 1 to 31. Percentages are of firms with usable responses.

Characteristic

Required

shareholders can vote by postal ballot
percentage of shares voted at most recent AGM
company had shareholder resolution in last 5 years
disputes w. shareholders resolved by arbitration
shareholders requested extraordinary meeting in last
5 years
shareholders asked SEBI or Tribunal to investigate
oppression within last 5 years
company has preferred shares

(1956)

Firms with
characteristic
218 (73%)

mean
(median)
58% (60%)

52 (17%)
20 (7%)
14 (5%)
1
1

G. Related Party Transactions
Related party transactions and other forms of self-dealing by controlling shareholders are a
significant concern in India. Most Indian firms have a major, often controlling shareholder.
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) report evidence of tunneling within Indian business
groups. The good news is that 78% of the responding firms have policies requiring RPTs to be on
arms-length terms. The less good news is that there are lots of RPTs. Clause 49 requires the audit
committee to approve all RPTs and requires the firm to disclose "materially significant" RPTs to
shareholders. Ninety-four percent of firms said they reported RPTs to shareholders, but this
includes some firms which reported having no or negligible RPTs, and thus nothing to disclose.
When asked to quantify RPTs as a percentage of sales, 67% (20%) of firms with RPTs reported were
at least 1% (5%) of revenue. Sixty percent of firms reported that their board reviewed at least one
RPT in the last year; 36% reported board review of five or more transactions.
It is one thing to require RPTs to be on arms-length terms, but another to put procedures in
place to ensure that the policy is adhered to. Table 6 summarizes approval requirements, separately
for RPTs with an inside director and with a controller. Approval by non-conflicted directors is
uncommon (7-9% of firms require this) and approval by non-conflicted shareholders is rare (1%).
Thus, approval can often be influenced, and not infrequently dictated, by a controller.

Compare Brazil, where many firms issue preferred shares, which are in substance nonvoting common shares,
to ensure that the control group retains control. See Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b).
8
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Table 6. Approval Requirements for Related Party Transactions
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. We cannot distinguish between “no” and
missing responses.

Transaction with
with inside
with controlling
director
shareholder
81 (27%)
102 (34%)
96 (32%)
82 (27%)
212 (70%)
182 (61%)
37 (12%)
44 (15%)
26 (9%)
20 (7%)
2 (1%)
3 (1%)

Related Party Transaction Approval
Requirements
no specific requirement
approval by audit committee
approval by board of directors
approval by shareholders
approval by non-conflicted directors
approval by non-conflicted shareholders

H. Cross-Listing and Financial Disclosure
Table 7 summarizes information on cross-listing and financial disclosure. Cross-listing may,
depending on the destination exchange, require the firm to provide additional disclosures. Twentytwo firms (7%) are cross-listed, some on more than one non-Indian exchange.9 However, only four
firms are cross-listed on US exchanges (in the US on levels 2 or 3 -- four firms on the New York
Stock Exchange and none on NASDAQ -- and hence are subject to U.S. reporting requirements and
the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act.. The rest cross-list on European markets or in the U.S. over-thecounter market, where they face few disclosure requirements (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2009).
Only about 7% of firms prepare financial statements that meet U.S. GAAP or International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
Table 7. Financial Disclosure
Table shows number of Indian private firms (% of responding firms) with a positive response to the indicated ith items.
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006.
Question
Company has shares cross-listed in another country

If yes, which country:
UK
Luxembourg
Germany (Frankfurt or Berlin)
U.S. – off exchange
U.S. - New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ
Company provides IFRS or U.S. GAAPfinancial statements

Yes
22

% Yes
7%

12
11
10
6
4
20

6.8%

Neither SEBI nor the stock exchanges maintains a website containing annual reports or
financial statements for all listed firms. Thus, firm websites are an important way that investors can
obtain this information. Table 8 summarizes what firms provide. About 67% provide annual
financial statements on their website. About half also post the annual report to shareholders; a
similar number provide press releases. About 43% post a notice of an upcoming shareholder
opinion, but nary a firm announces the meeting results. Finally, 6% have no website (or have one
that we could not find).

9

Cross-listing data was provided to us by Kate Litvak (see Litvak, 2007).
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Table 8. Information on Company Website
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. Number of responses varies from 276 to
278. Percentages are of firms with usable responses.

Information Item
Financial information
annual financial statements
annual report to shareholders
share price information
press releases
notice of upcoming shareholder meetings
results of shareholder meetings
Website not located

Yes

% Yes

182
137
145
154
137
0
18

67%
50%
54%
57%
46%
0%
6%

I. Since When?
We asked firms how long selected governance practices had been in place. Table 9
summarizes the responses. Many governance practices were adopted recently -- especially those
which recently became legally required. -- such as having a written code of conduct for directors
and executives, which became mandatory in 2004. Similarly, policies on insider trading, on
recommendation of the external auditor by the audit committee, and RPT disclosure are mostly of
recent vintage. Use of stock options is recent as well; only 9 firms used them before 2000.
In contrast, the practice of separating the positions of CEO and chairman has a long vintage.
Its current use may partly reflect the Clause 49 rules, under which a firm is permitted to have at least
33% independent directors if these positions are separated, versus 50% otherwise. But many firms
voluntarily separate the two posts, including firms that separated them before Clause 49 was
adopted, and the 114 firms that have both separation and 50% independent directors (see Table 2).
Table 9. Since When Has a Practice Existed
Sample is 301 Indian private firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. For some questions, number of usable
responses may not sum to firms with practice because some firms did not answer the "since when" question.

Since When
Practice
When was company incorporated
Firm has separate CEO and chairman
Firm has system for evaluating CEO
Firm has code of conduct
policy restricting insider trading
audit committee recommends auditor
executives receive stock options
RPTs must be on arms-length terms
Material RPTs are disclosed to shareholders

Usable
Required
responses
298
163
137
266
(2004)
251
180
(2001)
48
185
224
(2001)

2000s

1990s

Earlier

6
46
71
246
218
149
39
111
170

83
57
43
13
37
24
7
31
31

209
60
23
7
6
7
2
43
23

J. Government Enforcement
In some countries, company law is enforced privately or not at all. In the U.S., for example,
the Securities and Exchange Commission enforces securities law, but Delaware corporate law is
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enforced only privately, through suits by shareholders, creditors, or the company itself. The Indian
government, in contrast, has a variety of powers under corporate law, including the compensation
limits noted above, as well as the power to provide relief for oppression or mismanagement, remove
management, demand a special audit, inspect the company’s accounts, and impose fines for some
company law violations.
These powers, however, are rarely exercised. In the last 5 years the government has
removed a director or blocked a director from serving at one Indian private firm and one foreigncontrolled firm in our sample, dismissed an executive at one government firm, and ordered a special
audit at three private firms. To be sure, powers that are rarely exercised can still be deterrents.
V. Is Corporate Governance Associated with Firm Value?
We turn next to the association between firm-level governance practices and market value.
We limit the sample to 276 non-bank Indian private firms with data available on Tobin’s q. We
construct a broad Indian corporate governance index, and ask whether the index or subindices
predicts market values. We use ln(Tobin's q) as our principal measure of market value (we take logs
to address high-q outliers), and market/book and market/sales in robustness checks.
Some caveats. The analysis below uses only cross-sectional data. Moreover, governance and
other firm characteristics could be endogenously determined. We have no instrument for
governance, so make no claims as to causation. Also, firm market values reflect trading prices for
noncontrolling shares, and does not capture any additional value enjoyed by controlling
shareholders. Governance changes could produce market value gains for outside investors by
increasing overall firm value, by reducing the private benefits of control enjoyed by insiders (thus
transferring value from insiders to outsiders), or both. We cannot distinguish here between these
two broad channels. We discuss in Part VI the extent to which our results might generalize to other
emerging markets.
A. Non-governance Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 10 defines the principal financial and other non-governance variables used in this
paper, and provides summary statistics. This data comes principally from Prowess, which is the
principal source of financial information for Indian firms, analogous to a combination of Compustat
and CRSP for U.S. firms.

13
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Table 10. Non-Governance Variables
Table describes and provides summary statistics for principal non-governance variables. Data from Prowess unless otherwise stated. Share values and balance sheet amounts
are measured at year end 2005. Income statement variables are measured for 2005 unless otherwise specified. R&D/sales, Advertising/sales, exports/sales, PPE/sales,
CAPEX/sales and EBDIT/sales are assumed to be zero if missing (7-15 firms depending on measure). Number of observations varies from 276 to 296. Amounts in crores.

Variables
Tobin’s q
Market-to-Book Ratio
Book Value of Assets
Market Value of Equity
Debt/Equity
Debt/Assets
Years Listed
Sales Growth
R&D/Sales
Advertising/Sales
Exports/Sales
PPE/Sales
Capex/Sales
EBDIT/Sales
Share Turnover
Foreign Ownership
Market Share
Cross-Listing Dummy
Promoter Ownership
Business Group Dummy
MSCI Dummy
Industry Dummies

Description

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Estimated [book value of debt + book value of preferred stock +
2.26
1.54
1.73
0.32
market value of common stock]/book value of assets.
Market value/book value of common stock. We drop 17 firms with
3.21
2.20
9.32
0
negative, zero or missing book value of common stock.
Book value of assets.
905
199
3,134
9.01
Market value of common stock plus book value of preferred stock.
1,954
261
7,961
3.5
Book value of debt divided by market value of common stock.
1.18
0.72
1.97
0
Book value of debt divided by book value of total assets
1.34
0.66
2.67
0
Number of years since original listing.
29.72
21
22.34
3
Geometric growth rate from 2003 to 2005 (or available period).
0.35
0.17
1.46
-0.39
Research and development (R&D) expense/sales.
0.002
0
0.013
0
Ratio of advertising expense to sales.
0.009
0
0.022
0
Ratio of export revenue to sales.
0.232
0.07
0.31
0
Ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales.
0.65
0.40
0.95
0.004
Ratio of capital expenditures to sales.
1.19
0.62
2.58
0.044
Ratio of earnings before income and taxes to sales.
0.18
0.15
0.82
-11.71
Average daily shares traded during 2005/shares held by public
0.007
0.0023
0.017
0.00001
shareholders
Foreign ownership of the firm's common shares divided by
8.38
2.92
12.29
0
common shares outstanding.
Firm's share of sales by all firms in same 4-digit industry.
0.02
0.005
0.056
0
1 if firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange.
0.08
0
0.27
0
Percentage share ownership by promoters.
49.11
49.78
18.47
0
1 if a member of a business group, 0 otherwise.
0.53
1
0.50
0
1 if firm included in Morgan Stanley Capital International Index at
0.03
0
0.17
0
year-end 2004, 0 otherwise. Source: MSCI.
10 industry groups, plus "other" category. Constructed using information from Prowess and company websites.

Maximum
13.88
149.53
42,545
81,737
19.46
36.21
126
21.32
0.17
0.18
1.02
9.89
36.59
5.99
0.15
66.02
0.44
1
98.19
1
1
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B. Construction of the Indian Corporate Governance Index
We rely on the survey and firm annual reports to construct an India Corporate Governance
Index (ICGI). We identify 49 firm attributes that are often believed to correspond to "good"
governance, on which we have reasonably complete data, reasonable variation across firms, and
sufficient difference from another element included in ICGI. Manifestly, there is judgment involved
on which elements to include. Each is coded "1" if a firm has the attribute; "0" otherwise. We
group these elements into indices as follows:


Board Structure (with subindices for board independence and board committees)



Disclosure (with subindices for disclosure substance and for auditor independence)



Related Party Transactions (subindices for volume of RPTs and approval procedures)



Shareholder Rights



Board Procedure (with subindices for overall procedure and for audit committee procedure)

Table 11 describes the index components. Within each index, we give equal weight to each
element. We normalize each index to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, and sum the normalized
index scores to obtain an overall ICGI score. If a firm has a missing value for a particular element,
we use its average score for the nonmissing values to compute each index.10
Table 11. Corporate Governance Index: Elements and Summary Statistics
Description and summary statistics for elements included in India Corporate Governance Index (ICGI), for 296 private,
non-bank Indian firms which responded to India CG Survey 2006. All variables are coded yes=1, no=0. In "responses"
column, numerator is number of "1" responses, denominator is total number of responses.
Label
Board Structure Index

Variable

Responses Mean % Responding

Board independence subindex
BdIn.1
BdIn.2
BdIn.3
BdIn.4

Board contains of at least 50% independent directors
Board contains over 50% independent directors
CEO is NOT chairman of the board
Compliance with Clause 49: Either (i) board consists of at
least 50% independent directors or (ii) board consists of at
least 1/3 independent directors and CEO is not chairman

205/290
135/290
175/296

0.71
0.47
0.59

98%
98%
100%

253/290

0.87

98%

268/284
213/296

0.94
0.72

96%
100%

270/287
185/296
216/294

0.94
0.63
0.73

97%
100%
99%

264/270

0.98

91%

182/271

0.67

92%

Board committee subindex
BdCm.1 Audit committee exists, has majority of indep. directors
BdCm.2 Compensation committee exists.
Disclosure Index

Disclosure substance subindex
Di.1
Di.2
Di.3
Di.4
Di.5

Related party transactions are disclosed to shareholders
Firm has regular meetings with analysts
Firm discloses direct and indirect 5% holders
No shareholder agreement among controlling shareholders,
or agreement exists and is disclosed.
Firm puts annual financial statements on web

10 For Board Independence subindex, three of the four elements require data on number of independent
directors, which is missing for 6 firms. We judged that multiplying these firms' scores on the remaining element (CEO
≠ chairman) by 4 would overweight to this element, so multiplied by 2 instead. Five of these 6 firms had CEO ≠
chairman.
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Label
Di.6
Di.7
Di.8
Di.9

Variable
Firm puts quarterly financial statements on web
Firm puts annual report on web
Firms puts directors’ report on web
Firm puts corporate governance report on web

16

Responses Mean % Responding
198/271
0.73
92%
137/273
0.50
92%
143/273
0.52
92%
148/273
0.54
92%

Auditor independence (disclosure reliability) subindex
Dr.1
Dr.2

Auditor does not provide non-audit services
Auditor does not provide non-audit services or non-audit
fees are < 25% of total auditor fees
Dr.3 Full board reviews auditor's recommendations
Dr.4 Audit partner is rotated every 5 years
Related Party Index

151/296

0.51

100%

185/296

0.63

100%

275/290
120/282

0.95
0.43

98%
95%

273/291

0.94

98%

270/291

0.93

98%

233/291
139/209

0.80
0.67

98%
71%

69/175

0.39

59%

226/289

0.78

98%

219/296

0.74

100%

97/296

0.33

100%

37/296

0.13

100%

197/296

0.66

100%

84/296

0.28

100%

26/296
213/292
20/266
273/295
3/294

0.09
0.73
0.08
0.93
0.01

100%
99%
90%
99%
99%

174/296
146/293
243/293
74/292
84/288
41/294
39/294
46/292
285/296
172/292
269/296

0.59
0.50
0.83
0.25
0.29
0.14
0.13
0.16
0.96
0.59
0.91

100%
99%
99%
99%
97%
99%
99%
99%
100%
99%
100%

199/293
191/293
212/292

0.68
0.65
0.73

99%
99%
99%

RPT volume subindex
Re.1
Re.2
Re.3
Re.4
Re.5
Re.6

Firm does not have loans to insiders
Firm does not have significant sales to or purchases from
insiders
Firm does not rent real property from or to an insider
Firm had negligible revenue from RPTs (0-1% of sales)
No RPTs brought to board or audit committee for approval
in last 3 years
RPTs are on arms-length terms

RPT approval subindex
Ra.1

RPTs with executives approved by board, audit committee or
shareholders
Ra.2 RPTs with executives approved by audit committee or noninterested directors
Ra.3 Shareholder approval of RPTs with executives
Ra.4 RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by board, audit
committee or shareholders
Ra.5 RPTs with controlling shareholder approved by audit committee
or non-interested directors
Shareholder Rights Index
Sh.1 Directors serve one year terms
Sh.2 Firm allows voting by postal ballot
Sh.3 Disputes with shareholders are subject to arbitration
Sh.4 Company has policy against insider trading
Sh.5 Board has one or more minority shareholder representatives
Board Procedure Index

Overall procedure subindex
Pr.1
Pr.2
Pr.3
Pr.4
Pr.5
Pr.6
Pr.7
Pr.8
Pr.9
Pr.10
Pr.11

Average board meeting attendance rate ≥ 80%
Firm has system to evaluate CEO
Firm has system to evaluate other executives
Firm has system to evaluate nonexecutive directors
Firm has succession plan for CEO
Firm has retirement age for nonexecutive directors
Directors receive regular board training
Firm has annual board meeting only for nonexecutives
Board receives materials in advance
Nonexecutives can hire own counsel and advisors
Firm has code of ethics

Audit committee procedure subindex
Pa.1
Pa.2
Pa.3

Firm has bylaws governing audit committee
Audit committee recommends external auditor
Independent members of committee meet separately
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Figure 1 shows the overall variation in the index. One firm with a very low score aside, the
distribution of ICGI is reasonably symmetric and close to normal.
Figure 1. Distribution of ICGI

0

.05

Density
.1

.15

.2

Fraction of firms with ICGI scores in indicated ranges, plus superimposed normal probability density function. Sample
= 296 private, non-bank Indian firms. Mean = 0 (by construction), median = 0.211; σ=2.71.

-10

-5

0

5

icgi

Table 12, Panel A provides summary statistics on ICGI and its components; Panel B
provides a correlation table. There is substantial spread on each index and subindex, and for ICGI
as a whole. The mean (median) firm has “1” values for 27.5 (27.8) elements. The inter-index
correlations are generally positive but modest, so there is only limited colinearity between indices.
Table 12. Summary Data for ICGI
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for ICGI and components (before normalizing), for 296 private, non-bank Indian firms
which responded to India CG Survey 2006.

Mean
Board Structure Index
Board Independence
Board Committees
Disclosure Index
Disclosure Substance
Disclosure Reliability
Related Party Index
Level of Related Party Transactions
Transaction Approval
Shareholder Rights Index
Procedure Index
Board Procedure
Audit Committee Procedure
Non-normalized sum of ICGI components
ICGI (sum of normalized subindices)

4.29
2.61
1.64
8.85
6.20
2.65
6.66
4.67
2.14
2.23
7.43
5.37
2.04
27.47
0

Stand.
Dev.
1.36
1.19
0.57
2.65
2.41
0.89
2.11
1.24
1.55
0.81
2.41
1.95
0.90
4.83
2.71

Min.

Max.

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9.0
-10.46

6
4
2
13
9
4
11
6
5
4.8
14
11
3
38.4
6.07

Max
possible
6
4
2
13
9
4
11
6
5
5
14
11
3
49
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Panel B. Correlations among ICGI and its components. ** and *** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
Statistically significant correlations (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface.

ICGI
ICGI
Board Structure Index
Disclosure Index
Related Party Index
Shareholder Rights Index
Board Procedure Index

1
0.54***
0.56***
0.53***
0.46***
0.61***

ICGI indicated
index

Board
Structure

0.20***
0.22***
0.19***
0.10***
0.29***

1
0.21***
0.089
0.044
0.12**

Disclosure

1
0.15***
-0.043
0.19***

Related
Party

Shareholder
Rights

1
0.060
0.15**

1
0.18***

C. Univariate Association Between Governance and Firm Value
We next assess the association between ICGI and its components, on one hand, and firms'
market values, on the other. Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of ICGI against Tobin's q at year-end
2005 (shortly before we conducted the survey), plus a regression line from a regression of Tobin's q
on ICGI plus a constant term. There is a visually apparent correlation; the simple correlation is 0.26
and the regression coefficient is 0.064 (t = 4.90).
We have 276 firms with data on Tobin's q. In Figure 2 and later regressions we drop 12
outlier observations, for which a studentized residual from regressing Tobin's q on ICGI is greater
than 1.96. This generates a regression sample of 264 firms.
Figure 2. ICGI (Indian Corporate Governance Index) and Tobin’s q

0

2

4

Tobin's q

6

8

Scatter plot of ICGI versus Tobin's q at year-end 2005 for 264 firms with data on Tobin’s q which responded
to India CG Survey 2006, after dropping 12 outlier observations based on |studentized residual| from
regression of ln(q) on ICGI > 1.96. Highest and lowest 5% of Tobin's q values are included in regression but
suppressed in the scatter plot for better visual presentation. Regression coefficient = 0.064 (t = 4.90).
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Fitted values
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D. Association Between Governance and Market Value: Full Sample Results
In Table 13, regressions (1)-(3) we regress ln(Tobin's q) against ICGI and control variables.
In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we do not drop outliers or keep them
but winsorize ln(q) at 5% and 95%. Regressions (4)-(5) report robustness checks with
ln(market/book) and ln(market/sales) as dependent variables.
Many firm characteristics can be associated with both Tobin's q and governance. We
therefore include a broad array of control variables, to limit omitted variable bias. We use ln(assets)
to control for the effect of firm size on Tobin’s q. In unreported robustness checks, we obtain
similar results using ln(sales). We include ln(years listed) as a proxy for firm age, because younger
firms are likely to be faster-growing and perhaps more intangible asset-intensive, which can lead to
higher Tobin’s q. We include leverage (debt/market value of common equity) because it can
influence Tobin’s q by reducing free cash flow problems.
We control for firms' growth prospects using geometric average sales growth over 20032005, for capital intensity using (PPE/sales, and for capital expenditures relative to the historical
capital stock (capex/PPE). We control for intangible assets using (R&D expense)/sales and
(advertising expense)/sales. Because export-oriented firms may be different than other firms, we
control for exports/sales. We control for profitability measured by EBDIT/sales. We control for
market share in 4-digit industry because it could affect both profitability and product market
constraints. We include share turnover (traded shares as a percentage of public float) as a measure
of liquidity, since share prices may be higher for firms with more easily traded shares. We include
promoter ownership as a measure of insider ownership. We include foreign ownership because
foreign investors are diversified and may be willing to pay higher prices than domestic investors,
thus affecting Tobin’s q, may pressure firms to improve their governance, or may invest in better
governed firms (Ferreira and Matos, 2007). Since both governance and Tobin’s q may reflect
industry factors, we include industry dummies.11 We include a business group dummy because
business group firms may have political connections, access to financing, or be more diversified,
which could affect Tobin’s q (Zattoni, Pedersen and Kumar, 2009; Singh and Gaur, 2009). We
include a cross-listing dummy, which can proxy for foreign investor interest, liquidity, and enhanced
disclosure, and a dummy variable for a firm's inclusion in the Morgan Stanley Capital International
Index for East Asia, which may proxy for liquidity and price pressure due to index fund purchases.
In regression (1), the only independent variables are ICGI and industry dummies. Including
these dummies reduces the coefficient on ICGI from 0.064 (Figure 1) to 0.057. As we add
additional control variables in regressions (2) and (3), the coefficient on ICGI declines to 0.034,
indicating the importance of a good set of control variables. However, ICGI remains statistically
significant (t = 2.75) and economically meaningful. A one standard deviation (2.71 point) increase in
ICGI predicts an 0.093 increase in ln(Tobin's q), or about a 17% increase in share price for a firm
with median Tobin's q (1.54) and median debt/total assets (0.66).12
11 Following Black and Khanna (2007), we construct 15 industry groups, of which 11 are represented in our
sample. The industries (number of firms) are: agriculture and manufacturing (151); chemicals (42); services (25);
computer (20); finance (15); construction (10); trade (9); metals (8); transportation (7); energy (2); and other (7).
12 Tobin’s q = (debt/assets) + (market value of equity/assets). A shock to share price affects only the second
term: Let T be the fractional increase in Tobin's q and S be the fractional share price increase. S = {[New (market
equity/assets)]/[Old (market equity/assets)] -1} = {[New q - (debt/assets)]/[Old q - (debt /assets)] - 1} = {[(Old
q)*(1+T) - (debt/assets)]/[Old q - (debt /assets)] - 1}. This equation can be solved for S if we know debt/assets, old q,
and the fractional change T.
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Table 13. OLS for Corporate Governance Index with Different Control Variables
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q), ln(market/book), and ln(market/sales) on ICGI and control variables.
We drop 12 outlier observations, based on |studentized residual| from regressing dependent variable on ICGI > 1.96.
*, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-values, based on White's heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors, are in parentheses. Significant results (at 5% or better) are shown in boldface.
Ln(Tobin's q)

Dependent variable
(1)
ICGI

0.0565***
(4.10)

Ln(assets)
Ln(years listed)
Debt/Equity
Sales Growth

(2)

0.0563***
(3.96)
-0.00578
(0.18)
0.0616
(1.08)
-0.0354
(1.30)
0.0528**
(2.39)

R&D/Sales
Advertising/Sales
Exports/Sales
PPE/Sales
Capex/PPE
EBDIT/Sales
Market Share
Share Turnover
Foreign Ownership
Promoter Ownership
Business Group Dummy
Cross Listing Dummy
MSCI Dummy
Intercept Term
Industry Dummies
Sample Size
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes

264
0.097

Ln(market/book) Ln(market/sales)
(3)

Yes
Yes

254
0.095

0.0342***
(2.75)
-0.0957***
(2.75)
0.0662
(1.23)
-0.00928
(0.41)
0.0327*
(1.65)
11.08***
(4.18)
5.134**
(2.43)
-0.195
(1.52)
-0.136**
(2.16)
0.0002
(0.61)
1.395***
(3.97)
1.317
(1.65)
2.740*
(1.79)
0.0125***
(3.65)
0.0005**
(2.18)
-0.071
(0.83)
0.314**
(2.39)
0.254
(1.40)
Yes
Yes

250
0.291

(4)

0.0322**
(1.97)
-0.0874**
(2.05)
0.1262*
(1.89)
0.084***
(2.93)
0.0468**
(2.11)
9.660***
(3.63)
5.402***
(2.65)
-0.248
(1.48)
-0.0941
(0.93)
-0.0001
(0.53)
0.9846**
(2.54)
1.969**
(2.31)
1.607
(0.90)
0.0133***
(3.54)
0.0059**
(2.28)
0.063
(0.62)
0.216
(1.14)
0.296
(1.35)
Yes
Yes

255
0.278

(5)

0.0400**
(2.11)
-0.076
(1.39)
0.042
(0.55)
-0.0615
(1.04)
0.0424
(1.15)
16.744*
(1.77)
5.16**
(2.17)
0.297
(0.17)
-0.0007
(0.01)
0.0003
(0.73)
2.352***
(4.92)
-0.309
(0.27)
4.752**
(2.45)
0.017***
(4.00)
0.006**
(2.07)
0.0001
(0.00)
0.455***
(2.78)
0.273
(1.29)
Yes
Yes

260
0.540

Several control variables are significant and generally remain so with the alternate dependent
variables. Larger firms have lower valuations. Firms which are intangible asset intensive, proxied by
advertising/sales and R&D/sales, have higher valuations. More profitable firms have higher
valuations, as do firms with higher ownership by the controlling shareholder or group and higher
foreign ownership. In unreported regressions, we add interactions between ICGI and the significant
control variables; none of the interaction terms are significant.
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E. Subindex Results
We next examine which subindices are associated with ln(q). Table 15, regression (1) reports
results if we include all five subindices as separate independent variables, in a regression otherwise
similar to our "full controls" specification (Table 13, regression (3)). In robustness checks, we
obtain similar results for each subindex by itself. In regression (1), Shareholder Rights Index is
positive and marginally significant. Shareholder rights also seems to drive the association between
ICGI and firm value for more profitable firms (regression (4)). The coefficients on Board Structure
and Disclosure Indices in the full sample regression (1) are positive but insignificant. The
coefficients on Board Procedure and Related Party Transactions are close to zero.
Table 15. OLS Results for Subindices
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on ICGI and each subindex. Control variables and sample are the
same as in Table 13, regression (3), and regressions are similar, except that we replace ICGI with five subindices as
separate variables. t-values, based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are reported in parentheses.
Adjusted R2 varies from 0.153 to 0.371. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant
results (at 5% level or better) are shown in boldface.
Ln(Tobin's q)

Dependent variable
Sample

Sample
size

(1) All firms

250

(2) BSE 500 firms

92

(3) non-BSE 500 firms

158

(4)

More profitable firms
(ROA>15%)

((5) High Ln(Tobin's q)

129
128

Board
Structure
Subindex

Disclosure
Subindex

0.044
(1.22)
0.046
(0.64)
0.072*
(1.75)
-0.004
(0.07)
0.025
(0.58)

0.061
(1.46)
-0.005
(0.06)
-0.010
(0.22)
0.041
(0.56)
0.061
(1.56)

Related Party Shareholder Rights Board Procedure
Subindex
Subindex
Subindex

0.003
(0.09)
-0.051
(0.73)
0.059
(1.41)
0.036
(0.56)
0.064
(1.50)

0.062*
(1.89)
0.062
(0.93)
0.042
(1.20)
0.130**
(2.37)
0.042
(1.11)

0.005
(0.15)
-0.058
(0.72)
-0.019
(0.42)
0.063
(1.01)
-0.013
(0.31)

The weak results for Board Structure Index should be compared to the significant negative
coefficient on a similar index in Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b)’s study of Brazil, the positive
coefficient in Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell’s (2008) multi-country study, and the strong positive
coefficient on a similar index in Black and Kim (2010). If we divide Board Structure Index into
Board Independence and Board Committee subindices, Board Independence subindex is not
significant; Board Committee subindex is positive and marginally significant (coefficient = 0.062, t =
1.75). We also varied the definition of Board Independence subindex, with similar results. One
reason why board independence is not strongly associated with market value is that India's minimum
requirements for board independence are strict enough so that overcompliance (which provides the
only variation we can test) does not predict firm value.
F. Subsample Results
We also divide the sample into various subsamples, and rerun the "full controls”
specification from Table 13, regression (3). As Table 14 reports, ICGI predicts higher Tobin’s q for
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more profitable firms, but not for less profitable firms.13 However, if we use a different
specification, in which we add an interaction between ROA and ICGI to Table 13, regression (3), the
interaction term is small and insignificant. We found no strong differences in the coefficient on
ICGI for large versus small, high versus low growth, manufacturing versus non-manufacturing, and
business group versus non-group subsamples.
Table 15. OLS Results for Subsamples
Ordinary least squares regressions of ln(Tobin's q) on ICGI for subsamples. Control variables and sample are the same
as in Table 14, regressions (3)-(4). Sample is divided at the sample median. t-values, based on White's
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels. Significant results (at 5% or better) are shown in boldface.
Dependent variable

Ln(Tobin’s q)
Sample (for
ln(q))

Entire Sample

250

More profitable firms
(Return on assets > 14.85%)
Less profitable firms
(Return on assets < 14.85%)

129
121

ICGI

0.034***
(2.75)
0.057***
(3.35)
0.012
(0.66)

Ln(Market/Book)

Other Controls Adjusted R2

Yes

0.291

Yes

0.265

Yes

0.188

ICGI

0.032**
(1.97)
0.062**
(2.80)
0.013
(0.56)

G. Endogeneity Concerns
Tables 14 and 15 provide evidence that firm-level governance is associated with higher
ln(Tobin's q). We cannot assess causation because we have only cross-sectional data, and no
plausible instrument for governance. But we can say at least a little bit about the likelihood that our
results may provide decent guides to causation.
For emerging markets, little is known about the extent to which reverse causation (with
better performance leading to better governance) or "optimal differences," in which governance
optimally differs across firms, make cross-sectional results unreliable in assessing causation (Arcot
and Bruno, 2006). For Korea, Black and Kim (2009) find weak evidence of reverse causation in
Korea. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) report that firm characteristics, other than firm size, only weakly
predict Korean firms’ governance choices. This suggests that endogeneity due to firms’ optimally
choosing governance to reflect firm characteristics may not be a large concern.
We cannot assess the likelihood of reverse causation with our dataset. However, if
governance were sensitive to a firm's circumstances, we might expect financial and ownership
characteristics to predict governance. In unreported regressions, we assess whether the control
variables used in Tables 14 and 15 predict firms' governance choices. Ln(assets), sales growth, and
profitability predict higher ICGI scores. However, regardless of which independent variables we
use, adjusted R2 values are negative (and become more so as we add more control variables). This is
consistent with the Black, Jang and Kim (2006) results for Korea, and suggests that the optimal
differences flavor of endogeneity may be a limited concern in India as well.

13 Compare Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2010b), who report that a Brazil governance index predict higher
Tobin’s q for both more profitable and less profitable firms, with similar coefficients; and Hutchinson and Gul (2004),
who report that governance is more important for Australian firms with high growth opportunities.
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VI. Implications for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets
In this part, we combine our findings with those from other “case studies” of emerging
markets. We seek to draw an overall picture of what corporate governance elements emerge as
important across countries.14 Our conclusions are tentative,, for several reasons. First, endogeneity
is an important concern. Yet most studies, including this one, rely on cross-sectional associations,
so their results may not be robust. Time-series studies are preferable, but are still vulnerable to
endogeneity concerns (e.g., Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2008). Second, different studies use different
governance indices. The “shareholder rights” measure in one study may map only loosely onto the
similarly named measure in another study. Third, different countries have different regulatory
minima, which affect the elements on which there is within-country variation, and the range of that
variation.
Generalizing turns out to be difficult. Most studies find an association between a
governance measure and Tobin’s q, but Connolly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan (2008, Thailand) do
not, at least without extensive digging. Which governance elements predict higher firm value also
varies across countries. This suggests that flexibility in governance rules, above a regulatory
minimum, would be valuable.
Board structure and outside directors. There is evidence that the combination of a minimum
number of outside directors and an audit committee staffed principally by outside directors can be
valuable, at least for larger firms. Black and Kim (2008) and Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) so find in
Korea, and Black and Khanna (2007) find evidence that India’s Clause 49 reforms, which were
largely concerned with board structure and audit committees, raised the value of large firms relative
to smaller firms. In this study, we find that board structure is positive and marginally significant for
non-BSE-500 firms, but not for larger firms. These weak results could partly reflect the fairly high
regulatory floor set by Clause 49.
Disclosure. There is also evidence that better disclosure predicts higher firm value. Black,
Kim, Jang and Park (2009) so find for Korea, with firm fixed effects, as do Black, Love and
Rachinsky (2006) for Russia, again with firm fixed effects, and Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and
Zhou (2007) for Hong Kong in cross-section. We find a positive and marginally significant
coefficient on disclosure for non-BSE 500 firms.
Shareholder rights. There is mixed evidence on whether a package of shareholder rights can
predict higher firm value. Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu (2009) so find for mainland China,
with firm fixed effects, as do we for India in cross-section. However, Cheung, Connelly,
Limpaphayom and Zhou (2007) find an insignificant negative coefficient on the same measure of
shareholder rights in cross-section in Hong Kong, and Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find an
insignificant, negative coefficient on a shareholder rights measure in Korea with firm fixed effects.
Related party transactions. There is mixed evidence on whether direct controls on related party
transactions predict higher firm value. Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) so find for Russia with
firm fixed effects, but we find no significant effect for India in cross-section. However, part of the
The other research we draw on includes Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009, Korea); Choi, Park and Yoo
(2007, Korea directors); Black & Kim (2008, Korea directors); Black & Khanna (2007, India); Dharmapala and Khanna
(2009, India); Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou (2007, Hong Kong); Black (2001, Russia); Black, Love and
Rachinsky (2006, Russia); Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) (Russia, tax enforcement) Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and
Lu (2009, China); Connolly, Limpaphayom and Nagarajan (2008, Thailand); Litvak (2007, effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on cross-listed firms).
14
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value added by independent directors may involve better control of related party transactions, so
that even if they occur, they are less adverse to minority shareholders. Black and Kim (2008) find
evidence of this for Korea with firm fixed effects . This indirect effect of governance on related
party transactions would be captured by a board structure measure, rather than the related party
transactions measure.
Board and committee procedures. Board and committee procedures are easy to measure, but there
is as yet no good evidence that they predict firm value. Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find an
insignificant coefficient on a board procedures measure in Korea with firm fixed effects, as do we
for India in cross-section.
Ownership parity. Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) find evidence for Korea, with firm fixed
effects, that a measure of “ownership parity” (whether the largest shareholder has equal voting and
economic rights) predicts higher firm value. A number of cross-country studies also find that higher
ownership parity predicts higher firm value (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002).
Firm size, profitability, and growth opportunities. It is plausible that large firms need different
governance structures than small firms. Our results support this proposition – the overall
association between ICGI and Tobin’s q is driven by the non-BSE 500 firms in our sample. On the
other hand, Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2009) report similar results for large and small firms. We
also find that the association between ICGI and Tobin’s q is present for high-profit (but not low
profit) firms, and for firms with high Tobin’s q, which proxies in part for growth opportunities (but
not low-q firms).
Our results for subsamples based on firm size and Tobin’s q are consistent with the
arguments that firms with greater need for external capital benefit more from governance reform
(Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Durnev and Kim, 2005). Other studies do not examine subsamples
divided in these ways; doing so could be a fruitful avenue for future research. Our results suggest
that one-size does not fit all in governance, which implies that there should be room for firms to
tailor governance to their own characteristics.
Inter-firm differences. Minimum mandatory rules can be valuable in some instances (Black and
Khanna, 2007 (India); Black and Kim, 2008 (Korea)). At the same time, the benefits of “better”
governance depend in part on firm characteristics. Moreover, governance regulations can
sometimes impose larger costs than benefits. The U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act offers an example, both
for U.S. firms and cross-listed foreign firms (Litvak, 2007; Zhang, 2009).
One response to inter-firm variation would be a relatively low regulatory floor, which
mandates only governance structures that are likely to benefit all or most firms. Another would
involve a comply-or-explain corporate governance code, of the sort used in the UK (see Arcot and
Bruno, 2006) and a number of other countries. India is considering a proposal to allow greater
customization of corporate governance rules in the form of the Indian Companies Bill 2008. This
flexibility could well prove to be beneficial.
Cross-country differences. Different countries may have different corporate governance needs.
For example, the mean and median Tobin's q's for our sample are over 2 (see Table 4). This
suggests a combination of strong growth prospects for most firms and investors not expecting a
high level of tunneling. In contrast, mean and median Tobin’s q levels are much lower in the other
countries for which we have similar case study evidence, and are below 1 in Korea (Black, Kim, Jang
and Park, 2009) and in the early years of the Russia study by Black, Love, and Rachinsky (2006), and
are often a small fraction of 1 (suggesting high tunneling risk) in Black’s (2001) study of Russian
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firms in 1999. This suggests that the core corporate governance problems may be different, either in
kind or in intensity, across countries, and may call for different remedies.
Public enforcement. Dharmapala and Khanna (2009) provide evidence supporting the value of
sanctions against Indian firms which did not comply with India’s governance rules, and against their
directors. This effect was found even though the change in official sanctions, which occurred in
2004, was not then (or since) followed by imposition of actual sanctions. Compare Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002, 2006), who report that enforced insider trading laws affect firm valuation, but
unenforced laws do not. Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) provide evidence from Russia that
enforcement of corporate income tax laws can benefit minority shareholders by limiting cash-flow
tunneling.
VII. Conclusion
We provide a detailed descriptive account of the governance practices of Indian public firms.
Most firms meet the board independence rules under Indian law, which require either 50% outside
directors or 1/3 outside directors and a separate CEO and board chairman, but 13% (38 firms) do
not. The board chairman often represents the controlling business group or other controlling
shareholder. Firms are more likely to comply with audit committee requirement, although 1% do
not. Related party transactions are common (67% of firms have RPTs representing 1% of more of
revenues), but approval requirements for them are often weak. For transactions with a controlling
shareholder, only 7% (1%) of firms require approval by non-conflicted directors (minority
shareholders). However, 78% of firms nominally require RPTs to be on “arms-length” terms, and
94% disclose them to shareholders. Only about 2/3rds of firms provide annual reports on their
websites. For those which do not, there is no good alternate source. Executive compensation is
modest by US standards, but CEOs face only a small risk of dismissal. Only about 75% of firms
allow voting by mail, even though this has been legally required since 1956. Government
enforcement actions against firms are almost nonexistent.
We also contribute to the literature on corporate governance indices and the connection
between governance and firm value. We build a broad Indian Corporate Governance Index (ICGI)
and examine the association between ICGI and firm market value. We find a positive and
statistically significant association between ICGI and firm market value in India. This is consistent
with prior research in other countries and in cross-country studies. The association is more
significant for more profitable firms and firms with higher growth opportunities. A subindex for
shareholder rights is individually significant, but subindices for board structure, disclosure, board
procedure, and related party transactions are not significant. The non-results for board structure
contrast to other recent studies, and suggest that India's legal requirements are sufficiently strict so
that overcompliance does not produce valuation gains.
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